Abstract. In this work, we combine the frameworks of Justification Logics and Logics of Plausibility-Based Beliefs to build a logic for MultiAgent Systems where each agent can explicitly state his justification for believing in a given sentence. Our logic is a normal modal logic based on the standard Kripke semantics, where we provide a semantic definition for the evidence terms and define the notion of plausible evidence for an agent, based on plausibility relations in the model. This way, unlike traditional Justification Logics, justifications can be actually faulty and unreliable. In our logic, agents can disagree not only over whether a sentence is true or false, but also on whether some evidence is a valid justification for a sentence or not. After defining our logic and its semantics, we provide a strongly complete axiomatic system for it and show that it has the finite model property and is decidable. Thus, this logic seems to be a good first step for the development of a dynamic logic that can model the processes of argumentation and debate in multi-agent systems.
Introduction and Motivation
Epistemic logics [15] are a particular kind of modal logics [10] where the modalities are used to describe epistemic notions such as knowledge and belief of agents. Traditional epistemic logics are expressive enough to describe knowledge and belief of multiple agents in a multi-agent system, including higher-order notions, such as the knowledge of one agent about the knowledge of another, and some notions of knowledge and belief that are related to groups of agents, such as "everybody in a group knows..." or "it is common knowledge in a group...".
Nevertheless, such epistemic logics have two important limitations. The first is that the knowledge or belief of an agent is static, i.e., it does not change over time. One of the reasons for this is that, in such logics, it is not possible to describe communication between the agents. The second is that the knowledge modeled by such logics is implicit, which means that if the agent knows something, then he knows it for some reason that remains unspecified.
In order to deal with the first limitation, Dynamic Epistemic Logics [11] were developed. In these logics, we can describe acts of communication between the agents. Such acts consist of truthful announcements that are made by one of the agents (or an external observer) to the other agents (or a sub-group of them).
In works such as [4, 5, 7, 8] , this framework of dynamic logics was extended so that not only knowledge, but also beliefs (which, unlike knowledge, may turn out to be actually false) could evolve over time. The semantics of such logics of dynamic beliefs is based on Plausibility Models, where each agent has a plausibility order for the possible states of the model and he believes in those sentences that are true in the most plausible states according to his plausibility order. The change of beliefs is then modeled as changes in the plausibility orders of the agents.
In order to deal with the second limitation, Justification Logics [1] [2] [3] were developed. In these logics, instead of formulas simply stating "Agent i knows ϕ", we have formulas that state "t is agent i's justification (or evidence) for knowing ϕ". Thus, these are logics of explicit knowledge, where every knowledge that an agent has is accompanied by an explicit justification for it. This is why Justification Logics are also called Logics of Explicit Knowledge or Logics of Evidence-Based Knowledge.
Justification Logics came from a previous framework, called Logic of Proofs [1] , where justifications described formal proofs of arithmetical theorems. Thus, justifications in traditional Justification Logics are usually rather strong and the presence of a justification for a logical sentence entails the truth of that sentence [2, 3] .
In the processes of argumentation and debate, be it an internal debate or a public debate where each agent tries to convince an external observer of his particular point of view, it is unrealistic to say that all of the announcements are truthful. The realistic assumption is that the announcements are merely sincere, i.e., each agent believes in what he announces. However, in order to convince others of their belief, an agent should not only state what he believes in, but also why he believes in it. So, the appropriate logic to model these processes would be a dynamic logic of evidence-based beliefs. In order to build such a logic, we combine aspects of Justification Logics with Plausibility Models, while considering now, unlike traditional Justification Logics, that justifications can actually be faulty and unreliable (so they no longer entail truth). Using Plausibility Models, we give a notion of plausible evidence, or plausible justification, for an agent. So, if an agent has a plausible evidence for a sentence, then he will believe in that sentence, but, as the evidence can possibly be faulty, this belief has the possibility to be false.
In the present work, we take a first step in order to build such a logic for the description of the processes of argumentation and debate. We build a normal modal logic (for the definition of normal modal logics, [10] can be consulted) where we can describe the plausibility of evidences for all the different agents, give a sound and strongly complete axiomatic system for this logic and show that it has the finite model property and is decidable.
As our next step, we plan to build a dynamic logic of explicit beliefs, adding to the present logic the actions that would model the communications between agents during the processes of argumentation and debate. This is not a trivial task. The standard announcements that describe changes of knowledge [11] , sometimes called hard announcements, are too strong for our needs, since they are required to be truthful and not merely sincere (using such announcements without respecting the requisite that the announced formula should be true can generate logical inconsistencies). On the other hand, the standard announcements that describe changes of beliefs, called belief upgrades or soft announcements [6] are too weak, since, even tough they are only required to be sincere, they still make the agents receiving the announcement start believing in it, regardless of their current beliefs. In our desired framework, the announcement of a sentence should be accompanied by a justification as to why the agent performing the announcement believes in it. Then, each agent receiving the announcement should judge by himself whether he should start believing or not in the announced sentence, based on his current beliefs both about what was announced and about the justification that was given.
There are, in the literature, works that combine aspects of Justification Logics and Dynamic Epistemic Logics. [19] developed the first proposal of a Justification Logic with communication between the agents. However, these communication actions were extremely simple. Later, the series of works [16] [17] [18] developed logics that add to Justification Logics a series of communication actions, some rather complex. However, those actions are all from the family of hard announcements, so they cannot be used for our purpose. Our combination of Justification Logics with explicit evidence terms and Plausibility Models and our use of evidence terms to model explicit beliefs instead of explicit knowledge seems to be a novel approach. [9] also developed a logic of evidence-based beliefs, but, unlike our logic, it has no explicit evidence terms in the language and some of the modalities are non-normal. Besides that, also unlike our logic, no complete proof system for that logic is presented.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the necessary concepts that are used as building blocks for our logic: Justification Logic and Plausibility Models. The language and semantics of our logic, called Logic of Plausible Justifications (LPJ), is presented in Section 3, where we also show that our logic has the finite model property and is decidable and present a sound and strongly complete axiomatic system for it. Finally, in Section 4, we state our final remarks and point out potential further developments, including the one which originally motivated this work: the construction of a dynamic logic that can model argumentation and debate in multi-agent systems.
Background Concepts
This section presents two important concepts for the construction of our logic: Justification Logic and Plausibility Models.
Justification Logic
In this section, we provide a brief account of Justification Logic. For more details, [1] [2] [3] 12] can be consulted. Definition 1. The language of basic Justification Logic consists of a countable set Φ of proposition symbols, a countable set C of evidence constants, a countable set X of evidence variables, all pairwise disjoint, and the boolean connectives ¬ and ∧. The formulas ϕ and the evidence terms t of the language are defined as follows:
where p ∈ Φ, c ∈ C and x ∈ X . We denote the set of all evidence terms of the language by T and the set of all formulas by F .
In this logic and in every other logic described in this paper, we use the standard abbreviations
Initially, the basic Justification Logic was defined in a purely syntactic manner, through an axiomatic system. Later, Fitting [12] provided a modal semantics for the logic.
Definition 2.
A frame for Justification Logic is a tuple F = (W, R) where W is a non-empty set of states and R ⊆ W × W is a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive.
Definition 3. A Fitting Model for Justification Logic is a tuple
W and E is an evidence function E : W × T → F satisfying the following conditions:
) and c ∈ C, then ϕ must be valid, as defined below.
Definition 4. Let M = (F, V, E) be a Fitting model. The notion of satisfaction of a formula ϕ in a model M at a state w, notation M, w ϕ, can be inductively defined as follows:
If M, w ϕ for every state w, we say that ϕ is globally satisfied in the model M, notation M ϕ. If ϕ is globally satisfied in all models M of a frame F, we say that ϕ is valid in F, notation F ϕ. Finally, if ϕ is valid in all frames, we say that ϕ is valid, notation ϕ.
From the semantical definition above, we can think of · as a form of evidencecontrolled Modus Ponens, + as a form of evidence combination, ! as a constructor of evidence for formulas that already contain evidence terms and evidence constants as atomic evidence for formulas that do not need further justification (since they are valid).
Plausibility Models
In this section, we present Plausibility Models for the single-agent case. The multi-agent case is covered in the presentation of our logic in the next section. Plausibility Models in the present form were introduced in [4, 5] and [7, 8] .
Definition 5. A Plausibility Frame is a tuple F = (W, ≥), where W is a nonempty set of states and ≥ ⊆ W × W is a relation that satisfies reflexivity, transitivity (thus, is a pre-order) and local connectivity (for all v, w ∈ W , v ≥ w or w ≥ v or both). ≥ is called a plausibility order.
When we think about the relation ≥ as an epistemic relation, we consider that, if v ≥ w, then the agent does not know for sure in which of the states v or w he actually is, but he considers that the state w is more plausible than the state v. The choice of the most plausible states as the minimal states according to the pre-order ≥, which seems counter-intuitive, comes from the fact that if we add the hypothesis that ≥ is well-founded, then we guarantee that the set of most plausible states is always well-defined.
As ≥ is transitive and locally connected, the agent considers that it is possible for him to be in any state of the model, but he considers some more plausible than others. In the particular case that v ≥ w and w ≥ v, the agent considers both states v and w to be equally plausible. Let us now discuss the kinds of belief that can be described in a Plausibility Model. One thing that all sorts of beliefs have in common, and what differentiates them from knowledge, is that there is always the possibility that a belief can be false. Nevertheless, beliefs are consistent, which means that an agent cannot simultaneously believe in φ and ¬φ.
For our discussion of beliefs, let us consider that the model M is finite or that the relation ≥ is well-founded. We can define the set Best(M) = {w ∈ W : v ≥ w, for all v ∈ W }. Then, we can define the weakest notion of belief (denoted by B) as M, w Bϕ iff M, v ϕ, for all v ∈ Best(M). Thus, an agent believes in ϕ if the formula is satisfied in the most plausible states, according to his plausibility order. The modality B is a normal modality (B(ϕ → ψ) → (Bϕ → Bψ)). However, B is not the modality directly associated with the relation ≥. Let us then define M, w ϕ iff M, v ϕ, for all v such that w ≥ v. The notion described by is called safe belief. An agent has safe belief in a formula if it is satisfied in all states that are more or equally plausible than the current one. Thus, safe belief implies belief. Safe belief is also normal. However, the "safety" of a belief can only be inferred by an external observer, because for an agent to know that one of his beliefs is safe he would need to know in which state he currently is. Finally, we define the notion of strong belief in a formula ϕ if all the states in which ϕ is satisfied are more plausible than all the states in which ϕ is not satisfied. Strong belief also implies belief, but strong belief is not normal.
In this section, we present our logic, discuss some of its expressive features and present a sound and strongly complete axiomatic system for it.
Language and Semantics
We start by defining the language for the formulas of our logic.
Definition 7. In order to define the language of LPJ, we need to take a finite set A = {1, . . . , n} of agents, a countable set Φ of proposition symbols and countable sets X i , i ∈ A, of evidence variables. We assume that each pair of such sets is disjoint. The formulas ϕ and the evidence terms t of the language are defined as follows:
where p ∈ Φ, i ∈ A, j ∈ N, x i j ∈ X i and g is a term not occurring in A, Φ or any of the sets X i . We denote the set of all evidence terms of the language by T .
In the rest of this paper, sometimes it is convenient to use the duals of some of our modalities: K i ϕ ≡ ¬K i ¬ϕ, ♦ i ϕ ≡ ¬ i ¬ϕ and t? ϕ ≡ ¬[t?]¬ϕ. We do not use the duals of ≫ i , P i and : i , but they can be defined analogously.
The first thing that we notice is that there are some differences between our evidence terms and the ones in Justification Logic. Our language does not have the operators · and !, it does not have a set C of evidence constants, having instead a single evidence constant g, it has evidence terms of the form t and proposition symbols are also evidence terms. We will discuss these differences after we present the semantics of our logic.
Definition 8.
A frame for LPJ is a tuple F = (W, {∼ i } i∈A , {≥ i } i∈A ) where -W is a non-empty set of states -∼ i ⊆ W × W is an equivalence relation.
-≥ i ⊆ W × W is a relation that satisfies reflexivity and transitivity. -For each i ∈ A, the relations ∼ i and ≥ i satisfy the following property:
We call this property weak connectivity.
In an LPJ frame, the relations ≥ i are the plausibility relations for each of the agents. They are pre-orders, just as in the single-agent setting of the previous section. Also as in the previous section, if v ≥ i w, then agent i does not know for sure in which of the states v or w he actually is, but he considers state w more plausible than state v. The relations ∼ i denote these relations of indistinguishability of states by each of the agents. This is why they are defined as
The relations ≥ i are no longer locally connected in our present multi-agent scenario. However, the property of weak connectivity implies that every pair of states in the frame is indistinguishable to at least one of the agents.
Definition 9.
A model for LPJ is a tuple M = (F, V, E), where F is a frame, V is a valuation function V : Φ → 2 W , mapping proposition symbols to sets of states, and E is an evidence function E : T → 2 W , mapping evidence terms to sets of states, that satisfies the following rules:
We can see, in this definition, how the semantics for our evidence terms is built. We follow a similar approach to the one presented in [9] and use what seems to be the simplest semantics for evidence: an evidence is a subset of states of the model. Roughly speaking, we say that an evidence term t is an evidence for a formula ϕ if ϕ is satisfied in all of the states in E(t) (in reality, we also have to check the plausibility of the evidence, as we discuss below).
As the proposition symbols also denote subsets of states (using the function V), we also use them as evidence terms. We can think of the evidences denoted by proposition symbols as the "common ground" for all of the agents. Then, we can use the variables in the sets X i to denote the "personal views" of each agent. The evidence term g can be considered as the "weakest" evidence, as it contains all the states in the model. It has a similar function to the evidence constants in Justification Logic (looking at the semantics below, we can see that g can be used by any agent as evidence for what he knows) and it can also replace the operator !, as we can see, from the definition below, that the formula t : i ϕ → g : i (t : i ϕ) is valid. We can drop the operator · since, in our semantics, it would be a particular case of the operator + to formulas in implication form. Finally, evidence terms of the form t denote evidence complementation. Definition 10. Let M = (F, V, E) be a model. The notion of satisfaction of a formula ϕ in a model M at a state w, notation M, w ϕ, can be inductively defined as follows:
1. there is v ∈ W such that w ∼ i v and v ∈ E(t) and 2. for all x, y ∈ W such that w ∼ i x and x ≥ i y, if x ∈ E(t), then y ∈ E(t). -M, w t : i ϕ iff M, w t ≫ i ϕ and M, w P i t.
The notions of global satisfaction, validity in a frame and validity are defined as in the previous section. We say that a formula ϕ is satisfiable if there is a model M and a state w in M such that M, w ϕ. A formula is not satisfiable iff its negation is valid. A (possibly infinite) set ∆ of formulas is satisfiable if there is a single model M and a single state w in M such that M, w ϕ, for all ϕ ∈ ∆.
Our modalities K i , i , [t?], ≫ i and : i are all normal. The modalities K i and i denote the usual notions of knowledge (satisfaction in all states indistinguishable from the current one) and safe belief (satisfaction in all states more or equally plausible than the current one), respectively.
Our modalities [t?] are inspired by PDL [14] test modalities. They allow us to verify whether a state belongs to an evidence t, by checking whether t? ⊤ is satisfied at a state. The relation associated to the modality [t?] is R t = {(w, w) : w ∈ E(t)}. The modalities ≫ i are inspired by Renne's [16] [17] [18] modality of admissibility. The semantics of a formula t : ϕ in Justification Logic is composed by two parts (see Section 2.1): the first one related to the evidence function and the second to the relations in the frame. Renne calls the first part admissibility and uses the modality ≫ to describe it. In our semantics, an agent i considers an evidence t admissible for a formula ϕ (t ≫ i ϕ) if, in all the states inside the evidence t that the agent consider possible for him to be, the formula ϕ is satisfied.
The modalities P i are used to denote that agent i considers an evidence to be plausible. The notion of plausibility of an evidence has some similarities to the notion of strong belief. An evidence is considered plausible if there is a state that the agent considers possible inside of the evidence and, among the states that the agent considers possible, all of the states inside the evidence are more plausible than all of the states outside the evidence. Finally, the modality : i is used to denote that an agent considers an evidence as plausible evidence or plausible justification for a formula. An evidence is plausible evidence for a formula if the agent considers the evidence to be plausible and considers the evidence to be admissible for the formula.
Theorem 1 (Finite Model Property). Every satisfiable formula ϕ is satisfiable in a finite model (i.e., a model with a finite number of states).
Proof. See appendix A.
⊓ ⊔ Corollary 1 (Decidability). The satisfiability problem for LPJ (determining whether a formula ϕ is satisfiable) is decidable.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 gives an upper bound (as a function of the size of ϕ) for the size of the models where ϕ must be checked. As there is a finite number of such models, they can all be verified to determine whether ϕ is satisfiable. ⊓ ⊔
Axiomatic System
We consider the set of axioms and rules in Figure 1 , where ϕ and ψ are arbitrary formulas, t and s are arbitrary evidence terms and p is an arbitrary proposition symbol. We present the axioms divided in groups related to their function.
Tautologies, Duals and Normality
≥i is reflexive and transitive
5. Construction of evidence terms
. Admissibility, Plausibility and Justification From the axioms above, perhaps Rel 2 is the one with the less clear purpose. Rel 1 states that every pair in ≥ i is also in ∼ i , while Rel 2 states that every pair in ∼ i is in ≥ i or in (≥ i ) −1 . Rel 2 is an adaptation with two modalities ( K i and ♦ i ) of the so-called .3 axiom (see [10] for more details about this axiom).
Every formula φ derivable from the axiomatic system above is called a theorem (denoted by ⊢ φ). A formula φ is consistent iff ¬φ is not a theorem, i.e., iff ⊢ ¬φ, and inconsistent otherwise. A finite set of formulas ∆ = {φ 1 , . . . , φ n } is consistent iff the formula ψ = φ 1 ∧ . . . ∧ φ n is consistent. Finally, an infinite set of formulas ∆ ′ is consistent iff every finite subset ∆ ⊂ ∆ ′ is consistent. The axiomatic system is said to be sound if every satisfiable formula is consistent (or, in an equivalent definition, if every satisfiable set of formulas is consistent). The axiomatic system is said to be complete if every consistent formula is satisfiable. It is said to be strongly complete if every consistent set of formulas is satisfiable. Unlike the case of soundness, the two definitions for completeness are not equivalent. Strong completeness implies completeness, but the reciprocal is false.
The proof of the soundness of our axiomatic system is straightforward. It is not difficult to show that each of the axioms is valid according to the LPJ semantics and that the application of each of the rules to valid formulas give formulas that are also valid. The strong completeness proof is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Strong Completeness). Every consistent set of formulas is satisfiable in an LPJ model.
Proof. See appendix B.
⊓ ⊔
Final Remarks and Future Work
In this work, we combine aspects of Justification Logics with Plausibility Models to build a logic of explicit beliefs, where each agent can explicitly state which is his justification for believing in a given sentence. Our logic is a normal modal logic based on the standard Kripke semantics, where we provide a semantic definition for the evidence terms and define the notion of plausible evidence for an agent, based on plausibility relations in the model. In our logic, agents can disagree not only over whether a sentence is true or false, but also on whether some evidence is a valid justification for a sentence or not. Thus, unlike traditional Justification Logics, justifications can be faulty and unreliable in our logic. After defining our logic and its semantics, we provide a strongly complete axiomatic system for it and show that it has the finite model property and is decidable. We feel that this logic is a good first step for the development of a dynamic logic that can model the processes of argumentation and debate in multi-agent systems. We think that the appropriate logic to model these processes would be a dynamic logic of evidence-based beliefs. Thus, as our next step to build such a logic, we need to add to the present logic the actions that would model the communications between agents during the processes of argumentation and debate. In our desired framework, the announcement of a sentence should be accompanied by a justification as to why the agent performing the announcement believes in it. Then, each agent receiving the announcement should judge by himself whether he should start believing or not in the announced sentence, based on his current beliefs both about what was announced and about the justification that was given. In a preliminary analysis, it seems that we may have a few possible results for an announcement, depending on whether the agent receiving the announcement currently (before the announcement) believes in what was announced, in the negation of it or in neither and whether he currently considers that the justification that was given is plausible or not.
Beside this main goal, we feel that it would also be interesting to develop other proof systems for this logic, such as a tableau system or a sequent calculus, since they are more suited to be used as automatic provers than an axiomatic system. It would also be interesting to investigate the model-checking problem for this logic and to analyze its complexity. Finally, it would be interesting to analyze extensions of this logic with quantification over evidence terms, as [13] did in the context of traditional Justification Logics.
B Strong Completeness
In this section, we present a strong completeness proof for our axiomatization using the standard technique of the construction of canonical models, adapting it to the particular features of our logic. For more details on this construction, [10] can be consulted.
Given a consistent set of formulas ∆, we can expand this set using the standard Lindenbaum construction [10] to obtain a maximal consistent set (MCS) ∆ + ⊇ ∆. A set Γ is a MCS if it is consistent and all sets Γ ′ Γ are inconsistent. Any MCS Γ has the following important property: for every formula ϕ in the language, ϕ ∈ Γ iff ¬ϕ / ∈ Γ .
Definition 13 (Canonical Pre-Model). The canonical LPJ pre-model is the tuple
-W C is the set of all MCS's.
Lemma 1 (Sound Evidence Lemma). The canonical evidence function E C as defined above satisfies all of the properties required of an evidence function in an LPJ model (definition 9).
Proof.
-Γ ∈ E C (p) iff p? ⊤ ∈ Γ iff, by axiom E 2 , p ∈ Γ iff Γ ∈ V C (p), so E C (p) = V C (p), for all p ∈ Φ. -Γ ∈ E C (g) iff g? ⊤ ∈ Γ , which is always the case by axiom E 3 , so E C (g) = W
C . -Γ ∈ E C (t 1 + t 2 ) iff (t 1 + t 2 )? ⊤ ∈ Γ iff, by axiom E 5 , t 1 ? ⊤ ∈ Γ and t 2 ? ⊤ ∈ Γ iff Γ ∈ E C (t 1 ) and Γ ∈ E C (t 2 ), so E C (t 1 +t 2 ) = E C (t 1 ) ∩ E C (t 2 ). -Γ ∈ E C (t) iff t? ⊤ ∈ Γ iff, by axiom E 4 , ¬ t? ⊤ ∈ Γ iff t? ⊤ / ∈ Γ iff Γ / ∈ E C (t), so E C (t) = W C \ E C (t).
⊓ ⊔
It is straightforward to check that M C satisfies many of the properties of an LPJ model: ∼ Proof. We show the proof for the K i modality. The proof for the modality ♦ i is entirely analogous. Suppose that K i ψ ∈ Γ . We want to build a MCS Γ ′ such that ψ ∈ Γ ′ and Γ ∼ ′ , since Γ is a MCS. So, for all formulas ¬ K i ϕ ∈ Γ , we must have ¬ϕ ∈ Γ ′ . We can use this fact to build the set Σ = {ψ} ∪ {¬ϕ : ¬ K i ϕ ∈ Γ }.
